Appeal: direct answer
From Jay Dyer vs Ryan Dawson Debate: Theism vs Anti-Theism, Christianity vs Nihilism, Relativism, Atheism.
- #16721:56:31upheld Ryan Dawson epainos: direct answer (+1)
The council upheld the call: Ryan Dawson earned 1 point.
“I don't feel like you have to have a perfect objectivity to say something's wrong... it's dishonest for me. Like, no. I do believe in gravity, and I do believe I believe in a whole bunch of stuff that might end up being wrong, but I don't sincerely think it is.”
Diogenes: Against Chase's charge that lacking a standard of objectivity forbids him from calling anything wrong, Ryan answers with the fallibilist distinction between certainty and warranted high confidence, and refuses to feign a scepticism he does not hold.- Aristotle uphold: On the record: Ryan has held since early in the debate (e.g., "the difference between knowing and thinking is the degree of confidence") that fallibilist, degree-of-confidence empiricism grounds strong but revisable belief without claiming perfect objectivity; this answer is a direct, consistent application of that same standing framework to Chase's specific challenge, not a new or shifted position. Chase's charge was that lacking a fixed standard for objectivity makes it inconsistent for Ryan to call anything wrong; Ryan directly answers by distinguishing certainty from warranted high confidence and stating that pretending to universal doubt would be dishonest given his actual epistemic state — this squarely engages the inconsistency charge rather than sidestepping it.
- Socrates uphold: Read blind, found "direct answer". Chase had charged Ryan with being "inconsistent" for calling things wrong without an objective standard; Ryan directly answers by explaining his standing distinction (first given near the top of the debate) that knowing versus thinking is a matter of degree of confidence, and that honesty requires admitting some beliefs (like gravity) are held with near-certainty even without claiming perfect objectivity, which is consistent with his earlier stated framework rather than a new or contradictory position.
- Plato uphold: On the record: This is squarely consistent with Ryan's declared first principles ("objectivity is an aim, not an achievement," fallibilist empiricism) stated from the opening and repeated throughout (e.g. "the difference between knowing and thinking is the degree of confidence"); it is not a new or shifted position but a direct restatement of that framework applied to Chase's specific challenge. Chase's charge was that lacking a standard of objectivity makes it inconsistent for Ryan to call anything wrong or impossible; Ryan directly answers by distinguishing perfect/certain objectivity from warranted high confidence, explaining that fallibilist confidence (not blind skepticism) is what licenses him to call things wrong or impossible even while remaining open to revision.
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