Appeal: direct answer
From DEBATE: TRENT HORN VS. JAY DYER: SHOULD CHRISTIANS ACCEPT NATURAL THEOLOGY?.
- #8711:04:30upheld Trent Horn epainos: direct answer (+1)
The council upheld the call: Trent Horn earned 1 point.
“I don't believe God is a person because I'm a classical theist... we can talk about God in [qua] being and something that is shared among the three persons of the Trinity, that God is not a person, but he has personal qualities. God is intellect. God has will.” quote corrected
Diogenes: Asked whether there is a generic concept of person not referencing Father, Son and Spirit, he answers the question put and draws the relevant distinction between personhood and personal attributes rather than deflecting.- Aristotle uphold: On the record: Trent's position since the opening has been that natural theology yields shared true propositions about God (existence, attributes like eternality, power, goodness) via analogy of sense and referent (Hesperus/Phosphorus, water/H2O), not that it requires a theory-neutral 'generic person'; this line is consistent with that stance, not a new position. Jay's question was explicit ("do you think there's a generic conception of person that doesn't reference the father, the son, and the holy spirit?") and Trent answers it directly: no, he denies God is a person in that sense and instead distinguishes personal qualities (intellect, will) shared by the three persons, rather than positing a generic personhood apart from the Trinity. This is responsive to the question put and draws a real distinction, meeting the definition of a direct answer even though Jay remained unsatisfied and kept pressing.
- Socrates uphold: Read blind, found "direct answer". This is Trent's direct response to Jay's pointed question, asked moments earlier, "do you think there's a generic conception of person that doesn't reference the father, the son, and the holy spirit?" Rather than dodging, Trent answers squarely by drawing a distinction: God as such is not a person (he denies the premise Jay attributes to him) but the divine nature possesses personal qualities (intellect, will) common to all three hypostases, which is what natural theology can access. This directly engages Jay's rigid-designator challenge rather than evading it.
- Plato uphold: On the record: Trent has held throughout that natural theology can establish shared divine attributes (intellect, will, goodness, existence) common to monotheists without needing to fully specify Trinitarian personhood, a position stated in his opening and consistently maintained; this answer is consistent with, not a departure from, that standing. Jay's question at 64:00 was direct: "do you think there's a generic conception of person that doesn't reference the father, the son, and the holy spirit?" Trent's quoted reply directly engages by denying the premise (he holds God is not a person under classical theism, avoiding the need for a generic "person" concept) while affirming that personal qualities like intellect and will are shared across the Trinity and knowable via natural theology. This is a substantive, on-point response that Jay himself then engages further ("So it's not an appeal to a person... to the father himself"), showing the exchange moved forward rather than being deflected.
Appeal this callout
Appeals come only from the debaters themselves. Sign in with Google to start; you'll then prove which debater you are, once.